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TWO CHEERS FOR SHIFTING THE PRESUMPTION 
OF VALIDITY: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR HOPPERTON 
DANIEL R. MANDELKER * 
AND A. DAN TARLOCK** 
Historically, local government land-use decisions have enjoyed a 
presumption of validity, and until the 1960s, judicial review of land-use 
decisions was generally minimal unless there was a clear taking or a 
violation of a landowner's right to equal protection of the laws. In the 
past thirty years, many courts have increased their scrutiny of local 
zoning decisions by shifting the burden of justification to units of local 
government. These cases have not, however, provided a coherent 
theory of this heightened scrutiny. Thus, the recent and growing 
refusal of courts to apply the presumption of validity is both puzzling 
and significant. In 1992, we wrote an article, Shifting the Presumption 
of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law,! which applied the process-
based theory of heightened judicial scrutiny developed in the famous 
footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products,2 augmented with 
modern theories of local government behavior, to explain why courts 
increasingly shift the burden of justification to communities. The ar-
ticle first traced the tension between the progressive vision of zoning 
and the reality oflocalland-use politics. Zoning was originally justified 
as the application of scientific policy for the betterment of the com-
munity, and proponents counseled judicial deference to local govern-
ments. This deference was supported both by the Jeffersonian faith 
in local institutions and the progressive vision that planning experts 
* Stamper Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. 
** Associate Dean for Faculty and Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of 
Law. 
1 Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in 
Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1 (1992). 
2 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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could control the excesses of popular democracy. After years of en-
couragement of, or indifference to, local politics, courts began to real-
ize that many land-use decisions are often parochial, arbitrary, and 
inefficient because they fail to give sufficient weight to important 
interests such as regional balance, neighborhood stability, social poli-
cies furthered by the land-use, as well as fundamental fairness to 
regulated landowners. 
The article next surveyed the use of evidentiary presumptions to 
resolve land-use controversies and the relationship between pre-
sumptions and heightened scrutiny of land-use decisions. We criti-
cized the use of evidentiary presumptions in land-use decisions for 
reasons that we repeat in this article. Nonetheless, we elected to use 
the presumption framework because presumption shifting is a means 
of administering heightened scrutiny, especially when courts have not 
developed a clear and coherent doctrine to determine when height-
ened scrutiny is appropriate. Courts use a presumption shift both 
when a clear fundamental constitutional interest is at stake-speech 
for example-as well as when the Supreme Court has not identified 
a fundamental interest or suspect class. A good example of the appli-
cation of this second category to land-use decisions is the use of a 
presumption shift to correct perceived defects in the zoning process. 
Spot zoning, downzoning, and shopping center location controversies 
are examples of presumptive shifts when no fundamental interest or 
suspect class is at issue. 
Our central argument was that Carolene Products provides the 
basis for heightened scrutiny of regulation that subjects fundamental 
individual constitutional liberties and minorities to the risk of majori-
tarian tyranny. Carolene Products was the basis for Professor John 
Hart Ely's justly celebrated defense of much of the post-World War 
II Court's constitutional jurisprudence, DEMOCRACY AND DrSTRusT.3 
Professor Ely developed a powerful process-based theory of the judi-
cial role to reconcile judicial review with our democratic form of 
government. The central judicial inquiry is whether a relevant group 
has been prejudiced by its exclusion from the political process.4 Pro-
3 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
4 The most recent and striking example of the application of Professor Ely's theory is Romer 
v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996) (States may not adopt laws which prohibit local govern-
ments from extending anti-discrimination laws to homosexual relationships because, U[c]entral 
both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection 
is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who 
seek its assistance."). 
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fessor Ely's theory has been challenged as insensitive to the limits of 
judicial action, incorrect in that his reading of the constitution is 
substantive rather than procedural, and too narrow in its focus on 
insular rather than more diffuse minorities. However, we concluded 
that Professor Ely's focus on political process failure, which he calls 
an anti-trust theory of constitutional adjudication, is especially rele-
vant to local governments and that many of the criticisms which 
render its application problematic at the federal level do not exist at 
the local level. The risk of group exclusion is greater at the local level 
than at the federal and state levels because process failure is more 
embedded in local political institutions. However, the application of 
Carolene Products to land-use requires a major revision of the foot-
note's assumptions about local politics. 
The major difference between local and high level governments 
stems from the consequences of territoriality. Territorial limits define 
the demographic and socioeconomic character of the local govern-
ment. "These characteristics in turn define the interest groups that 
compete in the local political process to form political coalitions. . . . 
[H]ow these coalitions organize, their strength in the bargaining proc-
ess, their ability to demand political recognition, and the government 
settings in which they operate determine the character of the local 
political process as it affects land-use regulation."5 We set out three 
categories of local governments: (1) pluralist, (2) captured pluralist, 
and (3) consensus non-pluralist. 
Local governments fail to conform to pluralist norms in two situ-
ations. First, a dominant land-use coalition may capture the commu-
nity and exclude other interests. Second, the land-use interests in the 
community may ignore larger regional interests. Capture theory, de-
veloped in the 1960s to explain why federal administrative agencies 
were unresponsive to new interests such as consumer and environ-
mental protection, provides a justification for shifting the presump-
tion of validity. A captured pluralist community was defined as one in 
which a relatively permanent coalition, likely anti-development, domi-
nates the community. Non-captured communities are characterized 
by rapid shifts in coalitions. We argued that these process failures can 
inform the law of presumption shifts, and sought to expand the 
justification for presumption shifting beyond land-use controls which 
infringe on a fundamental constitutional right. The extensive use of 
5 Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 31. 
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presumption shifts to protect constitutional rights has resulted in the 
constitutionalization of land-use controls in a way that is erratic and 
often insufficiently responsive to local land-use concerns. The two 
approaches can, however, be married by the least-restrictive-alterna-
tive-means-of-regulation standard articulated by Justice Powell in his 
concurring opinion in Young v. American Mini Theaters.6 
Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law 
endorsed a presumption shift to protect inherently vulnerable land 
uses excluded from the political process, such as when a community's 
political process is not representative of the pluralist nature of the 
surrounding population, or when a political process has been cap-
tured. The first category of land uses can be identified both by the 
criteria that the Court has used to protect vulnerable minorities 
against majoritarian prejudice and by new types of prejudice, such as 
that found in the cases involving L UL U s (locally undesirable land 
uses). Presumption shifting is also justified when pluralist bargaining 
does not occur in homogeneous communities. The problem here is not 
discrimination against community residents, but rather against non-
residents excluded from political bargaining. Communities can be 
identified by factors such as size, projected metropolitan growth, and 
land availability. Capture theory is, of course, a difficult category to 
apply because the idea is slippery. Federal and state constitutions 
guarantee voters the right to change political direction. Thus, it is not 
easy to distinguish a capture from properly functioning repre-
sentative government. We proposed two possible tests for this form 
of malfunction to reconcile a presumption shift with representative 
government. Courts can use facially suspect land-use patterns, such 
as spot zoning or poorly justified departures from a community com-
prehensive plan, as a basis for shifting the presumption. 
Professor Robert J. Hopperton's recent article in this journal, The 
Presumption of Validity in American Land-Use Law: A Substitute 
for Analysis, A Source of Significant Confusion,7 takes issue with our 
analysis of the use of presumption shifts to facilitate judicial review 
of suspect zoning decisions. Professor Hopperton's article does not 
dispute the need for greater judicial control over local land-use, but 
he argues that the concept of a presumption shift is a doctrinal dead-
end and takes us to task for failing to ask the right question: what 
justifies heightened judicial review?8 His basic argument is that 
6 Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 78-79 (1976). 
723 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 301 (1996). 
8 See id. at 324 & n.174. 
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heightened judicial review, divorced from the presumption of validity, 
will provide courts with clear standards of non-constitutional judicial 
review. The Presumption of Validity in American Land-Use Law: A 
Substitute for Analysis, A Source of Significant Confusion is a wel-
come contribution to land-use literature because it recognizes that 
there is more to land-use law than parsing Supreme Court takings 
opinions. Professor Hopperton's article highlights the confusion that 
surrounds the important question of judicial review of the vast ma-
jority of land-use decisions that do not violate the First, Fifth, or 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
We agree that there is a need for much more analysis of the stand-
ards of judicial review that courts should apply to land-use decisions 
where there is no clear violation of constitutional rights. However, we 
remain unconvinced that clarity and consistency will follow "[ilf courts 
can be persuaded to abandon presumptions .... "9 The ultimate issue 
that land-use challenges raise is, of course, what is the appropriate 
level of judicial scrutiny of a local legislative or administrative deci-
sion? Based on our collective seventy-plus years of struggling with 
land-use controls law, we find this an almost intractable question 
which can be approached but not "solved." Our modest argument in 
Shifting the Presumption of Validity boils down to this: the emphasis 
on the occasions when courts should shift the presumption of validity 
or constitutionality, i.e., to place a greater burden of justification on 
the local government, has two primary merits. First, it is a positive 
theory. It helps explain what courts are in fact doing. Second, it also 
is a useful normative starting point to construct a theory of judicial 
review because it focuses attention on the crucial issue in land-use 
litigation: what level of justification for a decision should be expected 
from a local government when a court suspects a process failure? 
This said, we concede that the merits of presumption analysis are 
marginal and subtle. But, compared to other available approaches, we 
think that they are substantial and merit judicial attention. The fit 
between classic presumption law and land-use litigation is not ideal. 
As we and Professor Hopperton point out, the use of a procedural 
device to supply gaps in evidence is ill-suited for the mixed questions 
of fact and judgment that characterize land-use decisions. However, 
we believe that a presumption-based analysis offers a better road map 
to the end Professor Hopperton seeks, heightened judicial review, 
than heightened review divorced from presumptions. We offer three 
reason for our defense of our reliance on presumptions. 
9 [d. at 325. 
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First, the presumption of validity is constitutionally-based and thus 
is a permanent feature of land-use law. Both principles of separation 
of powers and the theory of republican government compel deference 
to the decisions of elected officials or their delegees. Our experience 
teaching and practicing in the land-use and environmental fields con-
vinces us that effective government requires a relatively high toler-
ance for judgment based on less than ideal data. Like Professor Hop-
perton, we do not endorse the nihilistic public choice theories which 
presume that all government action is evil, unjustifiable wealth redis-
tribution, or ineffective, as embraced by some members of the Su-
preme COurtlO and many lower federal judges. Thus, all land-use 
decisions should start from the assumption that a fair and efficient 
decision was reached. The presumption of validity seems to capture 
the initial position as well as anyone concept, and the idea of a 
presumption shift captures the idea that a local government's burden 
of justification has increased. 
Second, abuse happens and thus, if one accepts the utility of some 
form of land-use controls, the big puzzle in land-use law is the back-
ground standard that a court should use in judicial review. There is 
no agreed-upon ideal theory of the urban or rural landscape that a 
court can use to test the reasonableness of a decision. However, 
heightened or hard-look judicial review only works if there is a back-
ground standard. In the absence of a clear background standard, two 
obvious candidates suggest themselves: rational decision-making and 
fundamental rights theory. Courts have, in fact, made extensive use 
of these theories to invalidate local land-use decisions. Courts have 
demanded less conclusory justifications from local jurisdictions and 
used the First and Fifth Amendments to protect minorities against 
majority tyranny. In our article, we sought to go beyond these cases 
and explain judicial intervention where the level of explanation was 
not "wooden"ll and there was no First or Fifth Amendment violation. 
Professor Hopperton illustrates his thesis that strict scrutiny, 
rather than a presumption shift, is the best standard of judicial review 
with two land cases which he claims are models of non-equal protec-
tion strict scrutiny. We are somewhat puzzled by his use of these two 
10 E.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 u.s. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
11 The phrase comes from Professor Gerald Gunther's searching classroom questions in Con-
stitutional Law at Stanford Law School, some thirty-two years before United States v. Lopez, 
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), probing the limits of the Commerce Clause as the basis for the proposed 
civil rights acts to prevent racial discrimination in public accommodations. 
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cases to illustrate the benefits of non-reliance on a presumption shift. 
They are not "pure" cases in which the court relied on the heightened 
standard of judicial review, rather than a presumption shift, to disci-
pline local land-use decision-making. In fact, both cases rely explicitly 
on a presumption shift to achieve their objective. The first is a leading 
Oregon case, Fasano v. Board of Commissioners of Washington 
County.12 Fasano is one of the first cases to hold that small-scale 
re-zonings are adjudicative rather than legislative decisions. The un-
derlying rationale, such as it is, for the decision, is the need to shift a 
higher burden of justification to local authorities. Fasano largely 
confirmed an earlier Oregon opinion which advocated this approach 
as a means of preventing municipalities from granting re-zonings as 
special favors. 13 Fasano's rationale has been questioned as unsup-
ported by the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence and, con-
trary to what Professor Hopperton concludes, provides little guidance 
to local authorities other than a warning to be more rational. Judicial 
review in Oregon has proceeded not under Fasano but under the 
state planning goals of the state land-use planning act.14 
Professor Hopperton's second paradigm of proper judicial review 
is Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder.15 
Snyder followed Fasano's characterization of re-zonings as quasi-ju-
dicial proceedings. The Florida Supreme Court used this charac-
terization to sustain an intermediate court of appeals opinion which 
held that a city cannot deny a re-zoning request consistent with a 
comprehensive plan unless it demonstrates that the existing zoning 
12 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). 
13 Roseta v. County of Washington, 458 P.2d 405 (Or. 1969). This decision relied in part on an 
early article by Professor Tarlock entitled Kentucky Planning and Land-Use Control Enabling 
Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of K.R.S. Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968), 
which reflected a rather dim view of local zoning based on his close observation of the continued 
frustration of planning objectives by elected and appointed officials in Lexington, Kentucky in 
the mid-1960s. Fasano reflected an equally dark view of local governments, also inadvertently 
influenced by Professor Tarlock's view that the level of post-New Deal judicial control was too 
low. The Fasano court had before it a long background clerk's memorandum, prepared by a 
former student of Professor Tarlock's from Indiana University, Bloomington, which strongly 
advocated a presumption shift to send the message that the court was disappointed at the level 
of planning actually practiced by Oregon municipalities. The memorandum's analysis is reflected 
in the holding and encapsulated in the opinion's cryptic sentences: "Local and small decision 
groups are simply not the equivalent in all respects of state and national legislatures. There is 
a growing judicial recognition of this fact of life .... " 
14 See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER & RODGER CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CON-
TROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 871-78 (1995). 
15 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993). 
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classification "accomplishes a legitimate public purpose."16 The inter-
mediate court of appeals had held that a landowner was entitled to a 
re-zoning unless the governmental body demonstrated by clear and 
convincing evidence that a more restricted use was necessary. The 
Florida Supreme Court, however, held that proof of consistency alone 
did not entitle the landowner to relief. At one point in the opinion, the 
Florida Supreme Court spoke of the necessity for a standard of strict 
scrutiny different from federal equal protection strict scrutiny, but 
the crux of the court's holding was a presumption shift: once the 
landowner demonstrates that the re-zoning is consistent with reason-
able procedural requirements and the comprehensive plan, "the bur-
den shifts to the government board to demonstrate that maintaining 
the existing zoning classification with respect to the property accom-
plishes a legitimate public purpose."17 
This leads us to the root of our dispute with Professor Hopperton 
and our third reason for disagreeing with his veneration of heightened 
scrutiny.18 Heightened judicial scrutiny is ultimately grounded in con-
stitutional concerns, and thus works best with a rights analysis. But, 
unless one adopts Professor Epstein's view that almost all zoning is 
unconstitutional,19 it is difficult to develop a rights analysis for zoning. 
For example, many cases protect neighbors' interests, although the 
neighbors generally lack any constitutional interest. Courts have de-
veloped some non-constitutional interests, such as the interest in the 
consistent application of a comprehensive plan. As the intermediate 
appellate court opinion in Snyder illustrates, heightened or non-con-
stitutional strict scrutiny, if there is such a concept, works best if 
there is an applicable comprehensive plan. In that case, however, a 
court might be better served applying the consistency doctrine di-
rectly rather than indirectly. In short, heightened scrutiny does not 
work in most cases. 
16Id. at 476. 
17Id. at 476. Earlier, the court cited our article, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality 
in Land-Use Decisions, 24 URB. LAW. 1 (1992). 
18 Professor Hopperton does not ultimately endorse any standard of judicial review other than 
to call for heightened scrutiny. Two possible models for standards consistent with his analysis 
are Professor Gerald Gunther's intermediate equal protection standard of "strengthened 'ra-
tionality' scrutiny," Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I, 21 (1972), or the hard-look doctrine applied 
in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
19 See generally RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
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The issue in disputed land-use cases is the level of justification that 
the local government must provide, not the interest of the party 
challenging the decision. The use of a presumption shift, imperfect as 
it is, can both "teach" local governments how to do it correctly and 
provide a necessary basis for both landowners and third parties to 
challenge a local decision when a local government cannot adequately 
explain a decision that is at variance with accepted planning theory 
and practice. 
Bad zoning is not quite as self-evident as pornography, but sensible 
state judges, who often have extensive experience with municipal 
politics, have a good sense when something is amiss.20 Judicial review 
of zoning decisions is filled with traps such as the prohibition against 
inquiry into legislative motive and the lack of clear entitlements to 
any given outcome. Naked heightened scrutiny directly exposes 
courts to these traps. On the other hand, the ability to shift the 
presumption of justification allows a court to intervene when there is 
evidence that the process failed, to see if the city can justify its 
decision. Our objective was to develop a theory of judicial review that 
would constrain but not chill local initiatives.21 We think the focus on 
a heightened burden of justification moves further in that direction 
than the new and undefined non- or quasi-constitutional theory of 
heightened scrutiny proposed by Professor Hopperton. 
20 Perhaps we are idealizing the power of judges, and while we do not endorse judicial zoning, 
we remain convinced that the disciplined, skeptical, and dispassionate judge, exemplified by the 
late Learned Hand, can playa constructive role in improving the administration of land-use 
controls. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994). In his 
path-breaking analysis of zoning practice, THE ZONING GAME 111 (1966), the late Richard F. 
Babcock urged judges to move away from the presumption of validity "to turn zoning from the 
petty, parochial device it now is to a viable tool of land-use policy." [d. Dick Babcock's words 
still ring true today. 
21 Cf Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
45 (1994). The article recasts the rationale for zoning as "a kind of 'prior appropriation' over the 
neighborhood commons," which allows developers to purchase entitlements through negotia-
tions administered by those neighbors elected to represent the neighborhood. This rationale for 
participatory zoning demands the kind of policing that we advocate through the use of a 
presumption shift because too many cases reflect low-level mob planning. 
